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Abstract 
 
In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing 
to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second 
public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto 
efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
This paper deals with individuals’ choices regarding the voluntary provision of two public 
goods in an experimental context. We present a two-stage public goods game where the individuals 
can contribute to one public good in each of two stages. Each public good is available in one stage 
only. The two public goods only differ in the marginal per capita return (MPR) accruing to each 
participant. In particular, the MPR of the public good available in stage 1 is greater than the one of 
the public good in stage 2. There is also a strong relationship between the contributions to the two 
public goods because the individual income from stage 2 depends on the decisions taken in the two 
stages of the game and not those in stage 2 only.  
Our work refers to the growing literature on two-game experiments. These experiments 
investigate the effects on subsequent social behaviour of both reinforcement and pre-existing 
tendencies toward cooperation or defection. For example, Cain (1998) has players participating in a 
dictator game in a first stage of the experiment, and then has them playing a prisoner’s dilemma. 
The first game allows players to be classified into “nice” and “stingy” subjects according to the 
percentage of endowment sent to the recipient and the second shows that “nice” players choose to 
cooperate most of the times when they are paired with other “nice” players. In Silverstein et al. 
(1998), subjects play two different versions of the prisoner’s dilemma, and find that cooperation in 
the second game declines regardless of the results coming from the earlier game. Albert et al. 
(2002) have participants play, first, an asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma and, second, a trust game. 
Their results indicate the possibility of spillover effects between decision tasks. Also, Chaudhuri at 
al. (2002) have an experimental design with a prisoner’s dilemma and a modified trust game where 
subjects play both roles. They find that cooperative individuals in the prisoner’s dilemma are more 
trusting in the second game; regardless of the different reward they receive for being cooperators in 
the prisoner’s dilemma. Hence, the main result, common to almost all of these works, is that what 
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subjects do in an apparently unrelated social environment may affect their choices and provide a 
reliable signal for others with whom they are strategically interacting.  
Our work relates to above mentioned papers in the sense that we are testing whether there 
are any differences in the eventual cooperation in a two-stage, two public goods, experiment 
compared to the cooperation coming from a standard VCM treatment. From a game-theoretical 
point of view, there should be no difference, and all the subjects should invest all their endowment 
in the private good in both stages. However, in our experiment, we expect that the share of subjects 
willing to contribute to the public good should do so in the first stage only, given that the MPR is 
higher than the one in the second stage of the game. Subjects may sustain the level of cooperation in 
the first stage because of the higher obtainable earnings. They should then decide to decrease the 
contributions in the second stage, or to free ride completely because of the lower MPR.  
In one of their treatments, Andreoni and Petrie (2004) show that the behaviour of subjects 
when allocating their initial endowments between two public goods differs only in terms of 
information. In particular, there is a broadcast public good and an anonymous public good available 
to subjects in each period. The authors show that participants contribute more when they are given 
the option of having their contribution announced. Moreover, if subjects do not contribute to the 
publicly announced public good, it is very unlikely that they will contribute anonymously. Then, 
while we tend to confirm the first result of Andreoni and Petrie (2004), quite surprisingly, our data 
are in contrast with their second result. In fact, we show that subjects tend to contribute to both 
public goods, although at a low level, regardless of the difference between the MPRs of the two 
public goods.  
The present study may also contribute to the experimental literature investigating the effects 
of confusion in public good games. This research postulates that high initial contributions decrease 
because players start understanding the game’s incentives better after some rounds. In a pioneering 
paper, Andreoni (1995) makes the following findings. Firstly, in the treatment implemented to 
eliminate the incentive for kindness, subjects are more likely to choose the dominant strategy of 
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free-riding; secondly, about half of the cooperators are confused about incentives, while the other 
half understand the dominant strategy but choose to cooperate out of kindness; finally, the decrease 
in cooperation may be not due to learning but to a frustrated attempt at kindness. Houser and 
Kurzban (2002) conduct a modified version of Andreoni’s (1995) experiment. They show that, 
consistent with Andreoni (1995), about half of all cooperation in the standard public good game is 
due to confusion, that confusion is responsible for more cooperation in early rounds than in later 
rounds and that reductions in confusion can explain the cooperation decay in the standard public 
good game.  
We believe our design may contribute to the discussion on the role of confusion. In fact, one 
result of the present work shows the level of cooperation in the standard public good game to be 
higher than that in the two-stage two public goods treatment. According to confusion theories, while 
in the former case the cooperation should be due to both confusion and social motives, in the latter, 
where the contribution choice in each period is doubled, subjects should be more aware of the free-
riding opportunity. Then, this result may be due to the decrease in confusion caused by our design.               
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and 
the theoretical predictions. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of the experiment and 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Experimental Design and Predictions 
 
 
2.1 The Design 
Our experimental setting involves two treatments, each of them played for 10 periods. The 
first treatment is a standard public-good game with participants divided into five groups of four 
players. All subjects are endowed with six tokens. They have to decide on the allocation of their 
endowment between a private good, A (xi), and a public good B (gi). Each token placed in A (xi) 
earns one Experimental Unit (EU) for the subject. In contrast, each token allocated to B (gi) gives 
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exactly the same payoff to each member of the group as shown in equation (1). Then, each subject 
gets the following payoff, 
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 The second treatment is organised as a two-stage two public goods game, where the second 
stage of the game is identical to the first treatment, differing only in the initial endowment. During 
stage I, subjects are asked to decide whether to allocate their initial endowment of six tokens 
between a private good, C (yi), and a public good D (zi). They are informed that the payoff from C 
(yi), together with a fixed amount of 6 tokens, will constitute the initial endowment for each 
participant available at the beginning of each period of stage II. Each token allocated to D (zi) gives 
exactly the same payoff to each member of the group, as shown in equation (2). Then, each subject 
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Considering equation (2), it is important to remember that the term in parentheses represents 
the earnings accruing equally to each member of the group from both D (zi) and B (gi). In this case, 
the marginal return accruing to every subject from D (zi) is 0.4.  
To summarize, we have 2 treatments, each with five groups of four subjects, each lasting for 
ten periods. We implement a fixed matching protocol1. That is, each subject plays with the same 
group members during each treatment. The first treatment (T1) is a standard public good game; 
while the second treatment (T2) is organised as a two-stage two public goods game, where the 
second stage of the game has the same structure of T1 but subjects may have different endowments.  
The experiment was conducted at the University of Catania. A total of 80 subjects were 
recruited among a population of students from a wide range of fields, such as economics, law and 
 
1 Subjects were aware that the software was assigning a new subject number to each of them after each period of the 
experiment. This is usually done in order to avoid any reputation effect within each group. 
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political science2. Each student participated in only one treatment of the experiment. The staff of the 
Centro Informazione Giuridica, at the University of Catania, developed the experimental software. 
Before beginning the experiment, the instructions were read aloud and explained in detail3. Any 
kind of communication was forbidden. Subjects typed written responses directly into the computer 
in their own time. At the end of each treatment, subjects were paid anonymously in cash at an 
exchange rate of 0.10 euro per EU earned. On average, the subjects earned 16.50 euro including a 5 
euro show-up fee. Each treatment lasted between 40 and 60 minutes. 
 
2.2 Predictions 
According to the standard game-theoretic approach, the Nash dominant strategy, obtained 
applying the backward induction procedure, predicts zero contribution to the provision of public 
goods. In each period, a self-interested fully rational subject should be playing the free-riding 
strategy4. From equation (1) and (2), it is clear that the Nash equilibrium does not coincide with the 
Pareto optimal solution. The full cooperation strategy suggests that each member of a group should 
invest all of her endowment in the provision of public goods, reaching the level of full cooperation 
at both stages.  
An alternative possible outcome of our experimental setting is the case where a subject 
decides to invest more into the public good in stage I than in stage II5. The subjects decision not to 
contribute in stage II may be due to the decrease in confusion. In fact, our design may help to 
eliminate the effects of confusion when subjects play almost the same game twice. In the absence of 
confusion, subjects should notice the differences in the MPR of the public goods and opt for the one 
with the highest MPR, free-riding on the provision of other public good. Our data confirm this 
                                                 
2 Our treatments have been run under both a neutral (40 subjects) and a cultural context (40 subjects). We checked for 
eventual framing effects without finding any significant differences between the average contributions in the neutral and 
cultural contexts. Hence, we have chosen to aggregate the data coming from the two treatments. For a detailed 
description of the cultural framing see Finocchiaro Castro (2004). 
3 In our experiment, we adopted the standard VCM instructions that, however, are available upon request.  
4 This strategy leads to the payoff of 6 tokens and 12 tokens in each period in the first and second treatment 
respectively. 
5 This strategy may lead to an individual payoff of 15.6 tokens, in the case of full contribution to the public good in 
stage I and of zero contributions to the public good in stage II. 
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tendency although it shows low contribution levels to the public good in stage II of the second 
treatment.   
 
3. The Results 
 
 
3.1 The data 
We first discuss some general aspects of our data. In Table 1 we show the average level of 
contribution of each treatment as a percentage of the endowment6. We begin by looking at the 
differences in the rates of contribution to the public good between the first (T1) and the second (T2) 
treatment. The contributions to the public good from T1 are always higher than the ones from the 
second stage of T2. On average, the level of contribution is 47.1% in T1 and 37.5% in T2. The same 
can be said if we consider only the results from period 1. While T1 starts at a very high level of 
contributions (62.1%), the second treatment shows a lower level of contributions (47%)7.  
  
- Table 1 about here - 
 
Turning our attention to the patterns of public goods contributions, we analyse the 
relationship between the values of T1 and T2. They show two decreasing patterns and their 
relationships are negative and significant8. It is important to notice that both trends end up a long 
way away from the Nash prediction of complete free-riding (36.3% in T1 and 29.5% in T2). In T1, 
the level of contribution in the last period (36.3%) is higher than the previous one (35.4%) and does 
not show the usual steep end-effect. At this point, checking the trends of the contributions to the 
public goods in each stage of T2, we find that the decreasing patterns present in Fig.1 seem to be 
                                                 
6 The levels of contributions coming from the second stages of both contexts have been weighted according to the 
different endowments available to each subject. 
7 Note that those levels of cooperation are perfectly in line with other experimental results on public goods (see 
Ledyard, 1995; Davis and Holt, 1993).  
8 At the 5% level, the p-values, referring to the 2-tailed Pearson correlation test, are p=0.01 and p=0.03 in T1 and T2 
respectively. 
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the same across treatments. In fact, in both stages of T2, we find negative and highly significant 
time trends of the contributions to the public good9. 
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
 
3.2 Public goods contributions across treatments 
The first aspect we are going to deal with will be the effect of the differences in the 
contribution levels to the public good in T1 and in the second stage of T2. As shown by Fig.1 and 
Table 1, the average contributions to the public good from the first treatment are almost always 
higher than the ones from stage II T2. In order to test for the significance of this difference, we 
implement the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test (MWU). The value we obtain from this test 
shows that the differences are significant (p=0.019)10. Thus, our hypothesis has been confirmed by 
the experimental data. In fact, as expected, we see a change in the level of contributions to the 
public good when the subjects face a two-stage two public goods treatment.  
In T2, on average, participants surprisingly allocated their endowments almost evenly 
between the two public goods, regardless of the difference in the MPR, and they contributed smaller 
amounts to the public good in the second stage when compared with the contributions in T111. 
Regarding the first observation, subjects clearly perceived the two public goods available in the 
second stage of T2 as substitutes and did not take the opportunity to gain higher total payoffs by 
focusing on the public good with the higher MPR or by fully contributing to both public goods. 
Regarding the second observation, two factors may explain the differences in the cooperation 
shown in T1 and in the second stage of T2. The first effect is given by the difference in endowments 
                                                 
9 At the 1% level, the p-values, referring to the 2-tailed Pearson correlation test, are p=0.002 and p=0.003 in stage 1 and 
stage 2 respectively. 
10 We have always used 10 independent observations to compute the Mann-Whitney U test, except when we tested the 
first period data where we could use 40 independent observations. All the p-values represent the results of 2-tailed 
Mann-Whitney U tests. 
11 The MWU test, run on the first and last period observations, finds significant differences in the first case (p = 0.004), 
but not in the second case (p = 0.172). 
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between the T1 and the second stage of T2. While in the former the initial endowment is 6 tokens in 
each period, in the latter the initial endowment is never smaller than 6 tokens and may be different 
between subjects12. We investigate the effect of this endowment effect looking at the coefficient of 
the independent variable OwnStage1C in table 2. On the one hand, this coefficient tells us the 
impact of the contribution in stage I of T2 on the contribution in stage II of T2. On the other hand, it 
tells us the effect of the decrease in the endowment available in the second stage of T2. In fact, the 
positive sign of this coefficient means that an increase in the contribution to the public good in the 
first stage in other words a decrease in the endowment in the second stage leads to a higher 
contribution to the public good in the second stage. Hence, when subjects faced an increase in the 
endowments in each period of the second stage, they constantly contributed less compared to the 
contributions in T113. The second effect, working in combination with this endowment effect, seems 
to be due to the decrease in confusion (Andreoni 1995). The contributions in T1 may arise from 
both confusion and social motives while, in the second stage of T2, subjects’ cooperative choices 
should be driven less by confusion than by social motives14 because of our two-stage design.  
The second aspect we want to check is the presence of a relationship between individual and 
group contributions in T2. Hence we run a regression that has as the dependent variable the 
individual contribution in the second stage of T2 and as independent variables the own contribution 
in the first stage of T2, the own contribution in the last period of the second stage of T2, the total 
contribution of the other members of the group in the first stage of T2 and the total contribution of 
the other members of the group in the last period of the second stage of T2. All the data used in the 
regression are expressed as a percentage of endowment. From Table 2, we notice that the only 
significant variable is the own contribution in the first stage of T2 (OwnStage1C)15. Then, the 
                                                 
12 The mean endowment in the second stage of T2 is 10.2 tokens, which is significantly different from the T1’s 
endowment of 6 tokens. The t-test for equality of means rejects the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance. 
13 This result is in line with other experimental works on the same issue (see, Chan et al., 1996 and 1999; Cherry et al., 
2003). 
14 Although we do not test formally for the effects of confusion versus those due to social motives, it seems rational to 
us to expect confusion in subjects after playing almost the same game twice for ten rounds. 
15 Removing the least significant independent variables from the regression, we end up always with the same result. 
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positive sign of the coefficient shows that the more (less) each individual contributes to the public 
good in the first stage, the more (less) he should allocate to the public good in the second stage.   
Using the public good contributions in T2, we can investigate the presence of correlation 
between the allocations chosen by subjects with both high and low contribution rates16. In this case, 
we do not find any systematic and significant tendency of “cooperators” to contribute high amounts 
of endowment in both stages17. This result may be due to the presence of two counteracting effects. 
First, the presence of cooperators who contribute relevant portions of their endowment in each stage 
and, second, subjects contributing a lot in the first stage and almost nothing in the second stage 
driven by the difference in the public goods’ MPR. Applying the 2-tailed Pearson correlation test on 
the individual investment decisions in the case of low cooperators, all low subjects but one show a 
positive and, in half the cases, significant level of correlation. In doing so, they make the correlation 
between first and second stage contribution in treatment 2 significant at an aggregate level, even if 
there is no systematic and significant tendency of “cooperators” to contribute high amounts of 
endowment in both stages.       
      
 
- Table 2 about here - 
    
 
 
                                                 
16 We consider a high contribution rate in stage I to be when it is greater than the 50% of the endowment; while a low 
contribution rate in stage I is when it is less than the 30% of the endowment. According to the above classification, only 
6 of 40 (15%) subjects can be labelled as “high cooperators”, while 16 of 40 (40%) subjects can be labelled as “low 
cooperators”.    
17 Applying the 2-tailed Pearson correlation test on the individual investment decisions in the case of high cooperators, 
one subject only shows a positive and significant correlation (p=0.011), while all the other subjects show correlation 
levels with mixed signs but never significant levels. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides an answer to the question of whether the adoption of a two-stage two 
public goods game design would cause a change in the contributions to public goods compared to 
the case of a standard public good game.  
In our design, individuals can contribute to one public good in each of two stages. Each 
public good is available in one stage only. The two public goods only differ in the marginal per 
capita return (MPR) accruing to each participant. In particular, the MPR of the public good 
available in stage 1 is greater than the one of the public good in stage 2. Also, there is a strong 
relationship between the contributions to both the public goods because the individual income from 
stage 2 depends on the decisions taken in the two stages of the game and not on those in stage 2 
only. 
We showed that the public good contributions in the second stage of the T2 are lower than 
the ones that take place in the standard VCM. Our result contributes to the literature on two-game 
experimental designs whose main aim is to investigate both the effects on subsequent social 
behaviour of reinforcement and pre-existing tendencies toward cooperation or defection. For 
example, Cain (1998) shows that subjects playing a prisoner’s dilemma strongly take the 
information gathered from a dictator game previously played into consideration. Albert et al. (2002) 
indicates the possibility of spillover effects between decisions taken in an asymmetric prisoner’s 
dilemma and those taken in a following a trust game. A similar result is also shown in Chaudhuri et 
al. (2002). A work very close to ours is the one from Andreoni and Petrie (2004). They show that, 
when subjects are deciding on the contributions to two public goods, one publicly announced and 
one anonymous, they give more to the latter. Moreover, if subjects do not contribute to the publicly 
announced public good, they are unlikely to contribute anonymously. Thus, subjects may rank the 
two public goods in terms of prestige.  
In our design, subjects may also rank the two public goods, however, in terms of monetary 
rewards. Hence, we expected that the share of subjects willing to contribute to the public good 
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would do so in the first stage only, given the higher MPR there than the one in the second stage of 
the game. Subjects may sustain the level of cooperation in the first stage, because of the higher 
obtainable earnings, and then decide to decrease the contributions in the second stage or to free ride 
completely because of the lower MPR. Quite surprisingly, our data showed that subjects tend to 
contribute at a low level to both public goods. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that the 
contributions made in the standard VCM did not show the common end-effect.  
Our design also contributes to the discussion on the role of confusion in public good games. 
This stream of research postulates that high initial contributions decrease because (as shown by 
Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) and Houser and Kurzban, 2002)) players start 
understanding the game’s incentives after some rounds. The results from the present paper showed 
that, on average, the level of cooperation in the standard public good game is higher than that in the 
two-stage two public goods treatment. While in the former the cooperation should be due to both 
confusion and social motives, in the latter, subjects should be more aware of the free-riding 
opportunity, given that they face a similar choice twice. Therefore, our findings tend to confirm the 
effects of the reduction in confusion discussed by Andreoni (1995). 
Our experimental findings indicate that more attention has to be devoted to the design of 
experiments’ ability to discern between the effects of confusion and social motives through the 
exploitation of all the positive externalities for the group.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12
Table 1: Average Contributions to Public Goods as Percentage of Endowment*  
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average 
            
Treatment 1 62.1 58.8 54.2 45.8 47.1 50.0 43.8 37.5 35.4 36.3 47.1 
 (12.2) (16.5) (14.0) (24.7) (17.2) (19.6) (22.6) (17.7) (14.7) (10.2) (9.30) 
            
Treatment 2 - Stage 1 43.8 40.4 46.3 46.7 38.3 29.6 24.6 24.6 32.1 22.9 34.9 
 (8.8) (11.1) (20.0) (8.1) (22.4) (16.3) (15.6) (8.4) (12.4) (17.4) (9.31) 
            
Treatment 2 - Stage 2 47.0 39.9 44.1 43.0 43.5 30.5 32.2 29.2 35.5 29.5 37.5 
 (11.8) (11.6) (13.8) (13.1) (13.2) (9.6) (15.1) (12.7) (14.1) (17.5) (6.82) 
                       
*The values in parentheses are the standard errors. 
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Figure 1 
 
Table 2: Regression (Dependent Variable: Stage 2C) 
  
 
  
  
 Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta     
 Constant 15.113 10.502  1.439 .159 
  OwnStage1C .628 .196 .653 3.208 .003 
  OwnlastpS2C -.045 .107 -.085 -.415 .680 
  OthersS1C .078 .348 .040 .224 .824 
  OtherslastpS2C -.017 .154 -.020 -.109 .914 
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